Identify Multiple Types of Social Influences on Smart Contract Adoption in Blockchain User Network: An Empirical Examination of CryptoKitties in Ethereum by Cai, Xudong et al.
Association for Information Systems 
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) 
ICIS 2019 Proceedings DLT, Blockchain and FinTech 
Identify Multiple Types of Social Influences on Smart Contract 
Adoption in Blockchain User Network: An Empirical Examination 
of CryptoKitties in Ethereum 
Xudong Cai 
Xi'an Jiao Tong University, 565305019@qq.com 
Xi Zhao 
Xi'an Jiaotong University, zhaoxi1@mail.xjtu.edu.cn 
Bin Zhang 
University of Arizona, binzhang@arizona.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2019 
Cai, Xudong; Zhao, Xi; and Zhang, Bin, "Identify Multiple Types of Social Influences on Smart Contract 
Adoption in Blockchain User Network: An Empirical Examination of CryptoKitties in Ethereum" (2019). ICIS 
2019 Proceedings. 16. 
https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2019/blockchain_fintech/blockchain_fintech/16 
This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) at AIS Electronic 
Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in ICIS 2019 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS 
Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org. 
 Peer Influence in Blockchain Network 
  
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 1 
What Drives Adoption of Smart Contract?: 
Identifying Peer Influences in Blockchain 
User Network 
Completed Research Paper 
 
Xudong Cai 
School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong 
University 
Xi’an, China  
cxd1995@stu.xjtu.edu.cn 
 
Bin Zhang 
Eller College of Management, 
University of Arizona 
Tucson, Arizona 
binzhang@arizona.edu 
Xi Zhao 
School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University 
Xi’an, China 
zhaoxi1@mail.xjtu.edu.cn 
 
Abstract 
Smart contract brings more versatile functions in blockchain technology. However, its 
adoption rate is not as high as expected. Currently, there is no thorough study addressing 
such problem. To fill such gap, we propose to use peer influence to explain smart contract 
adoption in blockchain user network. We explore whether and how multiple types of peer 
influence including direct pee influence and indirect peer influence, simultaneously affect 
individual adoption decisions of smart contracts. Our hypotheses are examined in the 
context of CryptoKitties adoption in the Ethereum network using the public dataset of 
Ethereum including 350 million transactions from over 20 million distinct accounts. Our 
results suggest that the adoption of the software is positively affected by direct peer 
influence and indirect peer influence. Moreover, we find that users who have higher social 
status and greater diversity of experience in the blockchain network are less susceptible 
to peer influence. The results provide strong evidence of peer influence on smart contract 
adoption through various mechanisms. 
Keywords:  blockchain, smart contracts, technology adoption, peer influence 
Introduction 
Recently blockchain technology has received increasing attention as it is believed to provide a potential 
solution to the trust issue in business process (Tschorsch and Scheuermann 2016). However, the public 
perception of blockchain technology is always limited to cryptocurrency valuations and little is about an 
even more useful technology called smart contracts, which is built upon blockchains (Beck and Muller-
Bloch 2017). Smart contracts are computer protocols that facilitate the execution of digital contracts in an 
algorithmically autonomous and conflict-free way. Inheriting the decentralized nature of blockchain 
technology, they could substitute intermediary services in multisided markets without relying on trusted 
authority (Glaser 2017). The implementations of smart contracts have expanded blockchain technology into 
various fields of applications including financial services, manufacturing, healthcare, and energy resources 
(Macrinici et al. 2018). For example, Initial coin offerings (ICOs), practical use case of smart contracts in 
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fundraising, have raised about $20 billion in the past two years and proven themselves a viable funding 
tool.  
Considering the potential benefits, it is surprising that the adoption of smart contracts is still in its infancy. 
According to a 2017 study conducted on Ethereum, the largest blockchain-based smart contract platform, 
81% of smart contracts have never been used and 73% of externally owned accounts (EOAs) have never 
used smart contracts (Chen et al. 2018). Technology adoption is always a core area of the information 
systems (IS) research (Venkatesh 2007). While existing literature mainly focuses on the security, privacy 
and scalability issues of smart contracts, the adoption of smart contracts is still unexplored (Alharby and 
Moorsel 2017, Macrinici et al. 2018). Therefore, it is crucial for researchers and practitioners to understand 
the adoption of smart contracts and facilitate the diffusion of new applications and projects on blockchains. 
Social influence has long been recognized as an important driver of technology adoption (Venkatesh and 
Brown 2001). Researchers have demonstrated the influence effects in many contexts, including online 
buying decision (Bell and Song 2007), mobile service application adoption (Aral et al. 2009), prescription 
choices (Nair et al. 2010), open source software license choice (Singh and Phelps 2013), and CRBT adoption 
(Zhang et al. 2018). However, social influence builds on the premise of uncertainty about the innovation 
(Wooten and Reed 1998) and sufficient homophily (Cialdini 2001, Burn 1991). In the context of blockchain 
network, individual identities are hidden by the anonymity of hashed address (Foley et al. 2019) and users 
are purely connected by transactional ties that convey no trust (Hawlitschek et al. 2018). The blockchain 
alters the informational environment (Cong and He 2019), and it may impede individuals to perceive and 
associate themselves with similar others that are critical processes to elicit social influence. Thus it is 
necessary to empirically investigate whether the theories still hold in the new environment. 
Our study aims to provide deep insights into understanding smart contract adoption in blockchain network 
in several ways. First, to our knowledge, our study represents the first empirical work that studies the 
adoption of smart contracts. It also represents the first attempt to study social influence in blockchain user 
network—a novel information environment. Second, we identify and differentiate multiple types of social 
influences in blockchain user network. By theorizing and empirical estimating the effects of social influence, 
we provide evidence that network structure can trigger smart contract adoption. Third, empirical studies of 
large-scale social networks remain relatively novel. While traditional studies are limited to thousands of 
nodes, we construct the blockchain user network containing millions of nodes using the public dataset of 
Ethereum. Fourth, it contributes to practice by providing platform managers and smart contract developers 
with important insights into better diffusion of blockchain applications and projects. 
To fill the gap, we propose that the adoption decision of smart contracts in blockchain user network is 
potentially subject to social influence using the context of CryptoKitties in Ethereum. CryptoKitties is one 
of the most popular game applications on the Ethereum platform. All financial transactions in the game 
such as purchasing, selling, breeding and siring are fulfilled by smart contract. Hence the adoption of 
CryptoKitties resembles a large-scale experiment of smart contract adoption in blockchain user network. 
For our investigation, we rely on the public dataset of Ethereum blockchain where all transactions are kept 
in consensus across the whole network and are characterized as transparent and tamper-proof. There have 
been over 400 million transactions among over 60 million distinct accounts since the release of Ethereum. 
Because of the large size of our data, our analyses are conducted on subpopulations to examine our 
hypotheses within reasonable computing time. The subpopulations are extracted from the dataset using the 
Louvain (Multilevel) algorithm (Blondel et al. 2008). Individuals in these subnetworks are densely 
connected with each other but sparsely connected with users out of the subnetwork (Newman 2003). 
Our analysis yields several interesting results about social influences on smart contract adoption in 
blockchain user network. We find that an individual’s adoption decision of smart contract in blockchain 
user network is simultaneously determined by multiple types of peer influences including the adoption 
decision of direct peers (adjacent neighbors) and indirect peers (non-adjacent neighbors). The existence of 
social influence suggests that network connections formed by transactions among blockchain users can very 
well trigger smart contract adoption. Our results suggest that the adoption of a smart contract is positively 
affected by direct peer influence and indirect peer influence. Moreover, we find that users who have higher 
social status in the blockchain network are less susceptible to peer influence. 
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Blockchain Context  
A blockchain refers to a distributed ledger that could record transactions in a verifiable and permanent way 
(Iansiti and Lakhani 2017). The data is stored in a continuous flow of blocks chained together secured from 
tampering and revision (de Vilaca Burgos et al. 2017). It was first popularized through the cryptocurrency 
Bitcoin and has been subsequently adopted by other forms of digital platforms (Catalini and Gans 2016). 
While online platforms are characterized by increased transparency, financial transactions are sensitive in 
nature and participants still prefer privacy (Burtch et al. 2015). Bearing in mind the fundamental tension 
of transparency and privacy, the implementation of the blockchain technology typically offers a new option 
for managing the degree of transparency and privacy (Cong and He 2019). Focusing on public blockchains, 
we identify several intrinsic features of the technology that can affect the behavior of blockchain users, 
including transparency, pseudo-anonymity, and trustlessness. 
First, blockchain provides users with increased transparency by offering a novel method for trading and 
tracking the ownership of anything of value (Yermack 2017, Francisco and Swanson 2018). While financial 
transactions kept in centralized ledgers (e.g. banks) can only be accessed and modified by highly trusted 
parties, the ownership records and transactions stored in blockchain are shared among all participants of 
the network (Malinova and Park 2016). The blockchain creates a decentralized public transaction ledger 
that could be used by any participant in the network to cheaply verify and settle transactions in 
cryptocurrencies (Catalini and Gans 2016). Any transaction data of the blockchain is visible and reliable, 
and any participant of blockchain has the permission to access the entire transaction information (Yang 
2019). Briefly, all behaviors of blockchain users are observable to any participant in the network. Because 
the visibility of an influencers’ behavior is one of the most important premises of peer influence (Marsden 
and Friedkin 1993, Mas and Moretti 2009), the increased transparency of blockchains also paves the way 
for peer influence to take place.  
Second, blockchain provides users with pseudo-anonymity to implement privacy (Yin et al. 2019). While all 
transactions and ownership records in blockchain are publicly visible, it still preserves a certain amount of 
privacy through asymmetric cryptography (Zheng et al. 2017). Individual identities are masked by a public 
key that is an alpha-numeric pseudonymous address (Foley et al. 2019). Users could transact anonymously 
without disclosing their personal information. The apparent anonymity and ease to create pseudo-
anonymous financial transactions in blockchain attract users who value their privacy (Yin et al. 2019). Users 
with anonymous communication channels become disinhibited, in that they are more likely to break settled 
patterns of behavior and challenge existing norms (Choi 2013, Suler 2004). Besides, anonymity would 
reduce the occurrence of homophily because most individual sociodemographic traits are not readily 
observable (Kang and Chung 2017). Given that homophily is a critical factor in the process of social 
influence, a low degree of homophily in blockchain may impede social influence to take place (Morvinski et 
al. 2017).  
Third, blockchain creates the ability to carry out trustless transactions that shift the entire basis of trust in 
financial transactions (Blundell-wignall 2014, Hawlitschek et al. 2018). While the financial crisis led to a 
loss of trust in financial intermediaries, blockchain provides the ability to remove the need for a trusted 
third party (Blundell-wignall 2014). Transactions between participants in blockchain system will not 
require mutual trust relationships (Yang 2019). The need for trust in blockchain is not obliterated but rather 
shifts from financial intermediaries towards algorithms that govern users’ interactions (Maurer et al. 2013, 
Beck et al. 2016). The blockchain uses peer-to-peer network protocols and purely mathematical methods 
(e.g. consensus mechanism with crypto-economic incentives) to verify authenticity of a transaction without 
the verification of any third parties. Given the positive relationship between trust and social influence (Tsai 
and Ghoshal 1998, Beyari and Abareshi 2019), transactional ties in blockchain convey no trust and it may 
impede social influence to take place. 
Hypotheses development 
Social influence refers to that an individual’s opinions and behaviors are influenced by referent others 
(Leenders 1997, Arial et al. 2009, Hartmann 2010, Iyengar et al. 2011). In the context of technology 
adoption, an individual will typically turn to prior adopters as the influential frame of reference to 
determine their adoption choice because of the uncertainty about the adoption decision (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983, Rogers 2003). A prominent framework that uncovers the causal effect behind social influence 
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on technology adoption is the heterogeneous diffusion model (Strang and Tuma 1993). The model 
decomposes social influence into three factors including the social proximity between prior and potential 
adopters, the infectiousness of information from prior adopters, and the susceptibility of a potential adopter 
(Greve 2005). Following the heterogeneous diffusion model (Strang and Tuma 1993), we extend the 
framework and focuses more on peer influence on smart contract adoption in blockchain user network. 
Based on the theoretical lens of social influence and data available for our analysis, we propose hypotheses 
of peer influence and susceptibility to peer influence while controlling individual characteristics and 
homophily (individuals tend to connect to others with similar characteristics; Burkhardt 1994, Leenders 
2002, Valente 2005). 
Peer Influence 
Peer influence refers that an individual adapt her attitude or behavior to those of her neighbors (Leenders 
2002). There are two approaches to conceptualizing peer influence, including direct peer influence 
(formally defined as cohesion) and indirect peer influence (formally defined as structural equivalence; 
Leenders 2002, Zhang et al. 2018). It is measured by the social distance between individuals in social 
networks. Each approach provides the focal user with different frames of reference and has its own causal 
mechanism with peer influence. 
Direct Peer Influence  
Direct peer influence (cohesion) defines peer influence in terms of the number, length, and strength of the 
ties between individuals in a network (Marsden and Friedkin 1993). It is formally restricted to individuals 
who are directed connected in a network (Burt 1982). The literature notes that direct peer influence could 
be due to communication or observational learning (Chen et al. 2011). Connected neighbors have greater 
fidelity with each other and are probably to communicate more frequently. The communication process 
with prior adopters exerts social pressures on the potential adopter and leads to their adoption (Rogers and 
Kincaid 1981). Another possible mechanism is observing the adoption behavior of her direct peers that is a 
more informative and persuasive signal (Rogers 2003, Qiu and Whinston 2017). 
In the context of CryptoKitties adoption, direct peers are users that the focal user transacts directly with. It 
is more likely that direct peers know of each other and observe each other’s behavior as they have 
established trust relationship between each other after a successful transaction. Individual are more likely 
to be interested in the behavior of direct peers and get familiar with the product from them and eventually 
adopt CryptoKitties. Additionally, the utility of adoption is not just derived from the smart contract and the 
game per se, but also from the number of adopters among direct peers of the focal user. A greater proportion 
of CryptoKitties adopters among direct peers may provide users with additional utility including helpful 
tips, sufficient resources, and suitable recommendation. In sum, an individual is more likely to adopt 
CryptoKitties with a higer proportion of prior adopters among her direct peers. 
H1 (Direct Peer Influence and CryptoKitties Adoption). The probability of adopting CryptoKitties for an 
individual is positively associated with the proportion of prior adopters among her direct peers in the 
blockchain network. 
Indirect Peer Influence  
Indirect peer influence (structural equivalence) defines peer influence in terms of the similarity of relations 
between individuals in a network (Marsden and Friedkin 1993). It is measured by the extent to which two 
individuals share common direct neighbors (Mizruchi 1993). Prior research finds indirect peer influence 
can be interpreted by the imitative behavior triggered by the competition over the same resources (Burt 
1987). Although indirect peers are not directly connected, they share relations with the same third parties 
and compete with each other to maintain their existing ties because third parties view them as socially 
substitutable objects to interact (Guler et al. 2002). Competition among indirect peers increases their 
incentives to monitor and imitate the adoption behavior of equivalent ones (Guler et al. 2002).  
In the context of CryptoKitties adoption, indirect peers have never interacted with each other but share the 
same common neighbors in the blockchain user network. In spite of not connected directly, they could know 
the existence of each other through the path between them in the blockchain network. To maintain the 
relationship with their common neighbors, an individual could be particularly sensitive to the behavior of 
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her indirect peers that are similar in relation embedded in the blockchain user network and imitate the 
adoption decision of CryptoKitties because of the memetic process (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The digital 
kitties sold on the platform are unique in appearance and could be seen as sparse resources. Thus, these 
indirectly connected customers who are willing to buy them are competitors. Such competition can be 
explained by the structural equivalence theory (Leenders 2002, Singh and Phelps 2013). Moreover, the 
competition over limited resources and first mover advantage increases the tendency to imitate the 
adoption decision of a smart contract of indirect peers. The more indirect peer influence an individual 
receives, the more she is likely to adopt a smart contract adopted by another one.  
H2 (Indirect Peer Influence and CryptoKitties Adoption). The probability of adopting CryptoKitties for 
an individual is positively associated with cumulative similarities with prior adopters among her indirect 
peers in the blockchain network. 
Susceptibility to Peer Influence  
Susceptibility to peer influence refers to the extent how an individual is influenced by information available 
about the innovation adopted by others (Greve 2005). High susceptibility individuals are more sensitive 
and receptive to others’ opinions or behaviors, and are consequently more likely to adopt the innovation. 
In many theoretical threshold-based contagion models, it is represented in which social influence occurs 
when the proportion of prior adopters among one’s peers has exceeded her intrinsic adoption threshold 
(Granovetter 1978, Valente 1996, Watts and Dodds 2007). However, little research has examined how the 
characteristics of potential adopters moderate the effects of social influence on adoption behaviors (Wejnert 
2002, Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004). In addressing the limitation, we argue that potential adopters’ 
susceptibility to peer influence is affected by social status and the diversity of experience. 
Social Status 
Social status refers to the position in a social structure based on esteem and respect (Turner 1988). It is 
formally measured by degree centrality in social networks. Prior research indicates that social status is 
relevant for individuals’ adoption decision (Rogers 2003, Balkundi and Harrison 2006). Status could be 
seen as an esteemed source of information and influence relate to adoption behavior.  
In the context of CryptoKitties adoption, social status represents the importance of a focal user in the 
Ethereum network. Since degree centrality in transactional networks could not capture social status (Hu 
and Van den Bulte 2014), we employ the balance (in ether) to capture the social status of individuals in 
blockchain user network. An individual with higher social status is more likely to deviate from the common 
normative expectancies of the group and thus are less susceptible to others’ behaviors (Iyengar et al. 2015). 
Furthermore, an individual with higher social status always receives more attention regarding her behavior 
from others. They will be more cautious to make decisions and are less likely to conform to others’ adoption 
behaviors. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3 (Social Status and Peer Influence). The effects of direct peer influence and indirect peer influence on 
the likelihood an individual will adopt CryptoKitties will decrease with her social status in the blockchain 
network. 
Diversity of Experience 
The diversity of one’s experience will also influence individual susceptibility to social influence. As an 
individual gains experience, she will be more familiar with the situation and have less incentive to be 
influenced by external sources of information (Louis 1980). The diversity of experience is positively related 
with the knowledge about a particular setting which increases individuals’ self-efficacy and reduces their 
incentives to alter their behavior (Bandura 1986). It also encourages individuals to consider the 
phenomenon from a variety of perspectives, which stimulates richer causal understandings and reduces the 
potential for decision biases (Argyris and Schön 1974). This richer understanding fosters skepticism in 
decision making and reduces the potential for decision biases (Janis 1972). 
In the context of CryptoKitties adoption, users with a more diverse experience in smart contract will have 
richer knowledge about smart contracts. They are more likely to be familiar with the technology and have 
already purchased similar products using similar technology. Consequently, they are less likely to learn 
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from others’ behavior. In sum, a blockchain user with more diverse experience with smart contracts will be 
less susceptible to peer influence on her adoption decision. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H4 (Diversity of Experience and Peer Influence). The effects of direct peer influence and indirect peer 
influence on the likelihood an individual will adopt CryptoKitties will decrease with the diversity of her 
prior experience in the blockchain network. 
To ensure the effects of peer influence are not confounded by other plausible mechanisms, we control for 
individual characteristics and homophily. Prior studies have found that individual’s behavior is also 
influenced by homophily which states that individuals with similar characteristics will tend to behavior 
similarly (Aral et al. 2009, Ma et al. 2015). Based on the theory and hypotheses outlined above, our research 
model is developed. Figure 1 presents our research model. 
Peer Influence
Direct Peer Influence
Indirect Peer Influence
Control Variables
Individual Characteristics
Homophily
Smart Contract Adoption
Peer Influence
Susceptibility to Peer Influence
Social Status Diversity of Experience
H1
H2
H3
H4
 
Figure 1. Research model 
Data Description  
Empirical Setting  
Ethereum is the largest open-source software platform leveraged on blockchain and smart contract 
technologies. As Ethereum approaches mass adoption, there have been over 400 million transactions 
among over 60 million distinct accounts on Ethereum. Large scales of transaction and users in Ethereum 
network make it a fertile setting to study the effects of social influence in blockchain user network. 
Ethereum is not only the marketplace of cryptocurrencies, but also the smart contract platform that enable 
us to investigate the adoption decision of Ethereum users for smart contracts. 
CryptoKitties is one of the most active and successful blockchain applications on Ethereum. It is one of the 
earliest applications of blockchain technology for recreational purposes, making the blockchain 
approachable for everyday consumer. It allows users to own, transfer, and breed collectable digital cats by 
specially-developed smart contracts. Each kitty has unique appearance and could be visualized on the game 
website (cryptokitties.co). The game was an instant success since its release on 28 November 2017. A 
massive increase in interest and transactions associated with the game even contributed to significant 
slowdown and congestion on the Ethereum platform for months. In the blockchain, each kitty is transferred 
in the form of non-fungible token (NFT), which allows for each entity to be indivisible and unique. The kitty' 
ownership is tracked and proven by smart contract associated with CryptoKitties. All financial transactions 
within the game including purchasing, selling, breeding and siring are enforced by smart contracts. It 
enables researchers to study the effects of peer influence on the adoption decision of Cryptokitties. 
To test our hypotheses, we collected a unique dataset from Ethereum. The dataset comprises over 400 
million transactions among over 60 million Ethereum accounts from 30 July 2015 (the release day) to 
December 31, 2018. Each transaction includes the Ethereum addresses (hashed and anonymous user 
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accounts) of only one sender and one recipient, the type and value of cryptocurrency involved in the 
transaction, and time (Greenwich Mean Time). Before the measure of variables, we discarded failed 
transactions that are not seen as valid connections between users. And we discarded transactions associated 
with blockchain organizations or corporations, including exchanges, wallets or mining pools that are could 
not be seen as an individual. The data cleaning process was executed under the operator's big-data 
framework with Apache Spark and Yarn clusters. We could then measure the constructs and construct the 
blockchain user network. 
Variables 
To have reasonable observations for blockchain users, the temporal unit used in our study is set as a month. 
The response variable in our study is a binary variable indicating whether or not the Ethereum user have 
adopted the game CryptoKitties in a given month.  
Based on the aforementioned discussion, multiple types of peer influences are measured by the network 
structure established by Ethereum users monthly. Direct peer influence (cohesion) reflects the influence 
received from adjacent neighbors. As tie strength has been found to be positive with the influence received 
from connected neighbors, we consider strength of direct ties as the primary dimension of direct peer 
influence. In our context, we use the frequency of transactions between connected users as the proxy for tie 
strength. As individuals vary in the frequency of transactions, the influence of each transaction for 
individuals with a large frequency of transactions is not the same size as that of individuals with few 
transactions. To avoid the inflation of direct peer influence from a large frequency of transactions, our 
measure of direct peer influence is the proportion of transactions with prior adopters in one’s transactions. 
Indirect peer influence reflects the influence received from non-adjacent neighbors and is modeled by 
structural equivalence using the Euclidean distance as a measure for equivalence proximity between any 
neighbors. Following Zhang et al. (2018), we use the inverse of the Euclidean distances and a small 
constant–one to represent similarities in the relations between any indirect peers. Limited by the cognitive 
capacity to acquire and process information, users are simply unable to make inferences from the behavior 
of all others in the blockchain network. We restrict the sociometric distance between indirect peers less 
than 4. Our measure of indirect peer influence is the cumulative similarities with prior adopters among 
one’s indirect peers.  
Based on the aforementioned discussion, we consider two constructs of susceptibility to peer influence, 
including social status and the diversity of experience. We use balance to capture social status of an 
individual. It is measured by the amount of ether that a user owns in a given time period. To capture the 
diversity of experience for an individual, we use the number of  smart contracts used by an individual before 
a given time period. In our context, because of the anonymity of blockchain system, some individual 
characteristics such as demographics (e.g. age and gender) and location could not be derived. Given the 
data available for our analysis, limited individual characteristics including degree centrality and transaction 
behavior are controlled in our research. Degree centrality is measured by the number of direct ties with 
others in the Ethereum network. Transaction behavior is measured from different perspectives including 
tenure, balance, in value, out value, in frequency, out frequency, in time, out time, contract creation, 
contract transaction and diversity. In value is measured by the amount of ether that an Ethereum user 
receives. Out value is measured by the amount of ether that an Ethereum user sends. In frequency is 
measured by the frequency of transactions that an Ethereum user receives. Out frequency is measured by 
the frequency of transactions that an Ethereum user sends. In time is measured by the average time between 
transactions that an Ethereum user receives. Out time is measured by the average time between 
transactions that an Ethereum user sends. Homophily is formally defined as the similarity of individual 
characteristics including individual demographics (e.g. age and gender), location and behavior. Following 
Aral et al. (2009), we use the multiplication of observed individual characteristics and network terms to 
measure homophily. The more similarity in degree centrality and transaction behavior between Ethereum 
users in the network, the higher level of homophily exists between them. Table 1 presents detailed 
definitions of variables and the summarized descriptive statistics of sample data used in our study.  
Table 1. Variable Description and Summary Statistics 
Variable Description Mean SD Min Max 
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Adoption𝑖𝑡  Binary variable indicating whether 
user 𝑖 adopts CryptoKitties in month 𝑡 
(yes=1, no=0) 
0.07 0.25 0 1 
DirectInfluence𝑖𝑡 Proportion of transactions with prior 
adopters for user 𝑖 in month 𝑡 
0.097 0.27 0 1 
IndirectInfluence𝑖𝑡  Cumulative similarities with prior 
adopters among indirect peers of user 𝑖 in 
month 𝑡 
48.57 57.99 0 593 
Degree𝑖𝑡  Number of neighbors directly connected 
to user 𝑖 in month 𝑡 
2.56 42.80 0 6456 
Tunure𝑖𝑡 Number of months since the first 
transaction of user 𝑖 before month 𝑡 
5.87 4.33 0 40 
Balance𝑖𝑡 Amount of ether user 𝑖 owns in month 𝑡 10.13 442 0 62458 
InValue𝑖𝑡  Amount of ether user 𝑖 receives in month 𝑡 4.21 151.2 0 44450 
OutValue𝑖𝑡  Amount of ether user 𝑖 sends in month 𝑡 4.75 151.5 0 33138 
InFrequency𝑖𝑡  Frequency of transactions user 𝑖 receives 
in month 𝑡 
9.18 115.9 0 31348 
OutFrequency𝑖𝑡  Frequency of transactions user 𝑖 sends in 
month 𝑡 
15.53 193.1 0 25239 
InTime𝑖𝑡  Average time between transactions user 
𝑖 receives before month 𝑡 (in days) 
6.07 13.99 0 400.8 
OutTime𝑖𝑡  Average time between transactions user 
𝑖 sends before month 𝑡 (in days) 
5.50 15.36 0 398.7 
ContractCreation𝑖𝑡  Number of smart contracts created by 
user 𝑖 before month 𝑡 
1.73 230.2 0 36723 
ContractTransaction𝑖𝑡 Number of transactions with smart 
contracts of user 𝑖 before month 𝑡 
99.59 1021 0 179287 
Diversityit Number of smart contracts used by user 𝑖 
before month 𝑡 
5.31 30.12 0 4223 
Methodology 
Network Construction  
Considering the longitudinal nature of our dataset, we construct the blockchain user network for each 
month. In the original Ethereum network, each node represents a distinct Ethereum account. Because 
accounts on Ethereum are classified into two categories including EOA and smart contracts, the original 
network is a two-mode network. In our study, each EOA is seen as an Ethereum user and the connection is 
defined by transactions on Ethereum blockchain. The connection between an Ethereum user and a smart 
contract represents the creation or usage of the smart contract. The connection between Ethereum users 
represents the transfer of various cryptocurrencies including ether and other tokens. 
With the intention of capturing social influence that exists between connected people, we only retain nodes 
representing blockchain users and connections between them. Since the transaction is directed with the 
flow of cryptocurrencies, asymmetry may exist between senders and recipients. Asymmetric connection 
indicates an unequal and unstable relationship between peers, while the reverse is true for symmetric 
connection (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Thus, we further restricted the blockchain user network by 
retaining reciprocal connections only. In our research, the reciprocity for dyads (A, B) is defined as the 
condition for which A sends a transaction to B and B sends a transaction to A in the same time period. 
Figure 2 presents the construction of the blockchain user network. 
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Accordingly, we define the structure of blockchain user network using an adjacency matrix 𝐀. The value for 
the element of the adjacent matrix 𝐀 is binary, in which element 𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 1 if user 𝑖 and user 𝑗 have reciprocal 
connections, and 0 otherwise. Since the network is undirected, the adjacent matrix is also symmetric. Since 
an Ethereum user could not have reciprocal connections with herself, the diagonals of the adjacency matrix 
𝐀 are set as zeros.  
A
DB
C
Ether 
Transfer
Request
A
B
C
a) Two-mode Ethereum Network: 
Users (A,B,C) can send request 
to invoke contract (D) and users 
could transfer ether or other 
tokens among them.
b) Undirected Ethereum User Network:
Nodes are only Ethereum users and the 
ties represent reciprocal transactional 
connection.
 
Figure 2. Illustration of Blockchain User Network Construction 
Model 
In the social network literature, the network autocorrelation models are commonly used for studying 
diffusion. They take network autocorrelation term into consideration and are used to study whether 
connected individuals tend to have the same behaviors.  
To test our hypotheses, we need to compare the effects of different types of social influence while controlling 
for homophily. Hence, we use the multiple network-regime auto-probit (mNAP) model which supports a 
binary response variable and most importantly accommodates multiple network autocorrelation term 
simultaneously (Zhang et al. 2013). In the mNAP model, each user’s adoption is modeled with all the factors 
including direct peer influence, indirect peer influence and homophily taken into consideration. The 
specification of the m-NAP model is described as  
 
where  𝐲𝑡   is the vector of observed binary choices whether users adopt CryptoKitties in time period 𝑡. 𝐳𝑡  is 
the latent preference vector of users. If 𝐳𝑡 is larger than the threshold 0, users would choose to adopt the 
application; if 𝐳𝑡 is smaller than 0, users would choose not to adopt the application. The latent preference 
vector 𝐳𝑡   could be represented as a function of vector 𝐗𝑡, autocorrelation term 𝛉𝑡, and fixed effects 𝛈. Vector 
𝐗𝑡  is the degree centrality of all the users. Vector 𝛉𝑡 is the autocorrelation term, which is described as the 
sum of product between network structure and unobserved preference 𝐖𝑖𝑡𝛉𝑡. Scalar 𝜌𝑖  is the correspondent 
coefficient for the autocorrelation term 𝐖𝑖𝑡𝛉𝑡. Matrix 𝐖𝑖𝑡  represents the network structure in each time 
period 𝑡. Matrix 𝐖1𝑡 describes direct connections between one-hop neighbors, and elements are defined as 
transaction frequency of adjacent actors in time period 𝑡; Matrix 𝐖2𝑡 describes indirect connection in time 
period 𝑡  and elements are defined by inverse of Euclidean distance of adjacency actors. T To prevent 
indirect connections being blended with direct connections, we filter out elements between connected 
𝐲𝑡 = 𝟏(𝐳𝑡 > 0), 
𝐳𝑡 = 𝐱𝑡𝛃 + 𝛉𝑡 + 𝛈 + 𝛆𝑡, 
𝛉𝑡 = 𝜌1𝐖1𝑡𝛉𝑡 + 𝜌2𝐖2𝑡𝛉𝑡 + 𝜌3𝐖1𝑡𝐇𝑡 + 𝜌4𝐖2𝑡𝐇𝑡 + 𝐮𝑡, 
𝜺𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝐼), 
𝒖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝛿
2𝐼) 
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individuals by element-wise multiplication. The equivalence proximity between adjacent neighbors is set 
as zero. Thus the matrix 𝐖2𝑡 is not correlated with 𝐖1𝑡 mathematically. The matrix 𝐖2𝑡 is defined as 
 
where 𝑑𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the Euclidean between two individuals, calculated by the sum of squared difference between 
adjacent vectors of node 𝑖 and node 𝑗 in time period 𝑡.  𝐀𝑖𝑘 is the element of adjacency matrix 𝐀. If node 
𝑖 and node 𝑘 are adjacent neighbors, 𝐀𝑖𝑘  equals to 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Term 𝐇𝑡  is the matrix of individual attributes in period 𝑡  describing homophily including dimensions 
including degree centrality, tenure, balance, in frequency, out frequency, in value, out value, in time, out 
time, contract creation, contract usage, diversity. The terms 𝐖𝑖𝑡𝐇𝑡  is used to control for the effects of 
homophily that come from direct peers and indirect peers. The detailed model notations are provided in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Notations of the model 
Variables Description 
𝐲𝑡 
Vector of response variable for all users indicating the adoption 
decision of CryptoKitties in time t 
𝐱𝑡 Vector of degree centrality for all users in time t 
𝐖1𝑡 
Matrix describing direct connection in time t, elements are defined 
as the frequency of transactions of adjacent neighbors 
𝐖2𝑡 
Matrix describing indirect connection in time t, elements are defined 
as inverse of Euclidean distance of adjacent vectors  
𝐇𝑡 
Matrix describing homophily in time t, each column represents one 
measure of individual attributes including degree, account tenure, 
balance, in frequency, out frequency, in value, out value, in time, out 
time, contract creation, contract transaction, diversity 
Identification Strategy 
Extensive empirical studies have addressed the “reflection problem” which refers to the challenge in 
identification of the endogenous effect from the exogenous effects (Blume and Durlauf 2005, Soetevent 
2006). According to the identification condition derived by Bramoullé et al. (2009) and Zhang et al. (2018), 
social influence can be identified if the network contains an individual’s three-hop or higher neighbors. 
Figure 3 presents examples of extracted subnetworks. In these subnetworks, an edge from node i to node j 
represents that user i and user j have reciprocal transactions in that time period. As the network topology 
indicates, there are many paths between nodes with the distance higher than 3. Thus we could obtain 
asymptotically optimal estimates of social influence using the model. 
𝑑𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = √ ∑ (A𝑖𝑘 − A𝑗𝑘)2
𝑛
𝑘=1,𝑘≠𝑖,𝑗
 
𝐖2t
′ = {𝑠𝑖𝑗,𝑡} = {
1
𝑑𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + 1
} 
𝐖2𝑡 = (𝐈 − 𝐀) ∘ 𝐖2t
′  
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Figure 3. Example Subnetworks  
Analytical results 
Based on the aforementioned requirements, the symmetric Ethereum user network constructed in our 
study incorporates over 37 million transactions among about one million Ethereum users in the observed 
time period. Before examining the effects of multiple peer influences on smart contract adoption in the 
blockchain user network, we need to solve the problem of data size. The network is too large to analyze in 
reasonable time and also contains many clusters with different effect sizes. Hence, the model could only be 
analyzed using subnetworks of a smaller size and meta-analyses.  
To extract independent subnetworks from the blockchain user network, we used the Louvain (Multilevel) 
algorithm that outperforms other algorithms including Infomap, Label propagation, Walktrap, and 
Spinglass algorithms in computing time and accuracy for large social networks (Zhao et al. 2016). Each 
individual is placed within the subgroup from which she has the most connections. As a result, we could 
avoid contaminated influence from external networks. Note that the Louvain algorithm does not require 
subnetwork size as a parameter, and thus the size of extracted subpopulations is not predetermined. In our 
study, we extract 122,569 distinct subnetworks from the Ethereum user network. Some subnetworks are 
not considered because of its star topology structure or the absence of CryptoKitties adopters. Interestingly, 
many estimation results in these subnetworks generally follow the same pattern. 
Main Results 
The results of our model estimation for two different subpopulations are presented in Table 3. We observed 
significant effects of direct peer adoption and indirect peer adoption across these subpopulations. It shows 
that individual receive strong social influence from prior adopters among her direct peers and indirect peers.  
Table 3. Results of Analysis using mNAP model 
Variable Subpopulation (1) Subpopulation (2) 
Peer Influence 
Direct peer influence 0.045***(0.0066) 0.065**(0.032) 
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Indirect peer influence 0.00037***(0.00011) 0.00017 *(0.0001) 
Susceptibility to Peer Influence 
Balance* Direct influence −2.3 × 10−6*(1.3 × 10−6) −1.1 × 10−5*(5.8 × 10−6) 
Balance* Indirect influence −2.0 × 10−7***(6.9 × 10−8) −2.1 × 10−6**(8.7 × 10−7) 
Diversity* Direct influence −1.5 × 10−5(4.8 × 10−4) −1.5 × 10−2**(7 × 10−3) 
Diversity* Indirect influence −2.8 × 10−6***(6.9 × 10−7) −1.1 × 10−6(1.6 × 10−5) 
Direct Homophily 
Degree 4.7 × 10−5*(6.2 × 10−5) −1.4 × 10−5***(5.1 × 10−6) 
Tenure −8.2 × 10−4*(4.2 × 10−4) −1.9 × 10−3(1.9 × 10−3) 
Balance −4.9 × 10−7(3.0 × 10−7) 1.5 × 10−5(1.0 × 10−5) 
In_Frequency 3.4 × 10−6(4.2 × 10−6) 2.1 × 10−5*(1.1 × 10−5) 
Out_Frequency 1.2 × 10−6(2.8 × 10−6) −6.0 × 10−6*(3.4 × 10−6) 
In_Value 3.7 × 10−7(4.1 × 10−7) −1.2 × 10−5(1.3 × 10−5) 
Out_Value −9.6 × 10−7(6.0 × 10−7) −1.4 × 10−6(6.3 × 10−6) 
In_Time 2.9 × 10−4(2.4 × 10−4) 8.1 × 10−4(5.8 × 10−4) 
Out_Time −3.7 × 10−5(2.4 × 10−4) 7.1 × 10−5(1.9 × 10−4) 
Contract creation 3.4 × 10−5(5.8 × 10−5) 4.0 × 10−4(3.9 × 10−4) 
Contract transaction −1.9 × 10−8(4.2 × 10−7) 2.5 × 10−5(4.9 × 10−5) 
Diversity −1.5 × 10−4***(4.7 × 10−5) −3.9 × 10−4(5.0 × 10−4) 
Indirect Homophily 
Degree −5.6 × 10−6(3.4 × 10−6) 7.1 × 10−6**(3.1 × 10−6) 
Tenure 1.1 × 10−6(2.0 × 10−6) 2.7 × 10−6(1.7 × 10−6) 
Balance −1.4 × 10−6**(5.6 × 10−7) 1.6 × 10−6(1.6 × 10−6) 
In_Frequency −9.2 × 10−7***(3.2 × 10−7) 1.2 × 10−5***(4.7 × 10−6) 
Out_Frequency 5.3 × 10−7***(2.0 × 10−7) −1.0 × 10−5***(3.7 × 10−6) 
In_Value 1.1 × 10−6***(2.5 × 10−7) 9.5 × 10−6(6.0 × 10−6) 
Out_Value −3.5 × 10−8(1.9 × 10−7) −4.9 × 10−6(3.6 × 10−6) 
In_Time −6.3 × 10−5*(3.4 × 10−6) −9.5 × 10−6***(2.7 × 10−6) 
Out_Time 2.7 × 10−6(2.5 × 10−6) −3.5 × 10−6(3.2 × 10−6) 
Contract creation 2.8 × 10−6(1.1 × 10−5) 1.1 × 10−4(9.3 × 10−5) 
Contract transaction 5.7 × 10−8**(2.2 × 10−8) −5.1 × 10−6(3.5 × 10−6) 
Diversity −4.1 × 10−8***(1.6 × 10−6) 1.3 × 10−4***(9.3 × 10−5) 
*: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
We found that both direct peer influence and indirect peer influence play a positive role in the adoption of 
smart contracts in blockchain user network, thus supporting H1 and H2. It indicates that an Ethereum user 
will receive strong influence from prior adopters among her direct peers and indirect peers in the same 
subnetwork.  
We also found that the coefficient estimate for the interactions of peer influence (direct peer influence and 
indirect peer influence) and balance are significant and negative, thus supporting H3. It indicates that if an 
Ethereum user owns more wealth, she is less likely to be influenced by prior adopters among her peers. 
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Nevertheless, we observed that the coefficient estimate for the interactions of peer influence (direct peer 
influence and indirect peer influence) and diversity are not significant. One possible explanation is that the 
number of contracts used by users could not depict the diversity of experience as many contracts are highly 
homogenous in functionality. 
And we do not observe a significant effect of homophily across all subnetworks. It implies that CryptoKitties 
adoption is not mainly driven by homophily. Since we treat CryptoKitties as a binary variable and do not 
consider its type, the estimation results are expected as Ma et al. (2015) found that homophily only affects 
the purchase choice for production type.  
Goodness-of-Fit Test 
Because our model is non-nested and maximum likelihood is used to estimate parameters, Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) are used to measure the goodness of 
fit. Models with the lowest AIC and BIC value represent the best model. The definition of AIC, BIC is 
presented below.  
where k is the number of estimated parameters, L is the maximum value of the likelihood function for the 
model, N is the number of observations. 
As shown in Figure 3, when the model includes both direct and indirect peer adoption terms simultaneously, 
the model is best with the lowest AIC. Thus, both network autocorrelation terms should be incorporated in 
our model. The goodness-of-fit test also proves evidence that individual’s adoption of CryptoKitties is 
influenced by the adoption decision of direct peers and indirect peers. 
 
Figure 3. AIC of Four Completing Models 
Discussion  
While being a very useful technology built upon blockchain, smart contract is still not well adopted yet. Few 
studies have addressed the issue of how to facilitate the adoption. In this study, we analyzed the effects of 
multiple types of peer influence on the adoption of CryptoKitties in Ethereum using the mNAP model 
conducted on the subnetworks extracted from the Ethereum user network. Our study is the first work to 
investigate peer influence in blockchain user network. Our results show that the existence of peer influence 
in blockchain networks formed via reciprocal transactions among blockchain users. The adoption of 
CryptoKitties is positively affected by prior adopters among her direct peers and indirect peers. The results 
are obtained when homophily is controlled for, so the robustness of the estimation is assured. Based on 
these results, developers should use particular strategies to trigger more adoption. They need to focus on 
individuals with more direct connections in the Ethereum user network. 
AIC = 2𝑘 − 2 ln (?̂?) 
BIC = 𝑘 × ln (?̂?) − 2 ln (?̂?) 
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Implications 
Our research has both theoretical and practical implications. First, it is the first to study the adoption of 
new technology – smart contract in blockchain network empirically. While being a very useful technology 
built upon blockchain, smart contract is still not well adopted yet and few have addressed the issue. 
Therefore it is critical to understand and facilitate the adoption of smart contract. Second, our research 
deepens the understanding of social influence and underlying mechanisms on the adoption of smart 
contracts. We are the first to analyze multiple types of social influences simultaneously including degree 
centrality, peer effects, and homophily in blockchain networks. And we provide evidence of the existence of 
social influences on the adoption decision of smart contract for blockchain users. Third, Empirical studies 
on blockchain systems and smart contracts are limited. Our study represents the initial attempt to apply 
systematic IS theory and method to develop and validate the diffusion model in the anonymous and 
transparent environment of blockchain systems. Fourth, our study provides useful guidelines for promoting 
the dissemination of smart contract technology and suggests a more effective way for smart contract 
developers and blockchain project marketers in their efforts to promote the adoption of new applications 
on blockchains. They could use these factors identified in our study and design corresponding marketing 
strategies to better facilitate the adoption. For example, they should target existing adopters with many 
direct neighbors who are probably to mimic the adoption decision and should also avoid existing adopters 
with many indirect neighbors, because they are probably not to follow the adoption decision. 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
As the initial empirical work on smart contract adoption in the blockchain network, our study has several 
limitations that provide opportunities for future research. While various heuristic algorithms (Meiklejohn 
et al. 2013, Lischke and Fabian 2016, Maesa et al 2016) have been proposed to cluster addresses into real 
users in the Bitcoin network, they could not be applied to the Ethereum network (Chen et al. 2019). Unlike 
the transactions of Bitcoin which could have multiple sender and receivers, each transaction of Ethereum 
is associated with only one sender and one receiver. To build the user network from the transaction list of 
Ethereum, we have to assume that each EOA of Ethereum blockchain represents a distinct user. The 
resulting network approximates the real user network to some extent. 
Additionally, we consider all connections to be bidirectional or symmetric. While this is not a limitation in 
the present study, it could be useful to identify the directionality and separate out in-degree from out-degree. 
While indegree can be considered to be a measure of popularity, out-degree provides a better indication of 
activity level. Thus, by separating out the two effects, we will be able to investigate more complex social 
constructs in future studies. 
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